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Abstract 
 
The current financial crisis has given rise to calls to toughen considerably the 
codes of corporate governance put in place in many countries to regulate 
corporate behaviour (e.g. the UK Combined Code). These codes vary 
slightly in form but tend to contain a mix of non-discretionary regulations 
and discretionary guidance and information. Almost  all such codes embody 
some variation or other of the comply-or-explain principle. Companies 
should comply with the rules or explain why they do not. In this way the 
code framers avoid, or perhaps enable, a one-size-fits-all approach. It is this 
discretion that governments are under pressure to limit, but little is known 
about how it is used, in what circumstances, and to what effect? In this paper 
we report the findings of research carried out in the UK and Germany to 
investigate the extent to which large public companies comply with the rules, 
and the attitudes of company directors and legal counsel to using comply-or-
explain. We find that positive conformance with codes depends on factors 
such as the extent to which regulatees are engaged in the formation and 
revision of the code, and thus feel a sense of ownership;  the existence of 
interested and relevant monitors; and the extent to which soft regulation is a 
traditional means of control in a domain. We also found that pressure, both 
internal and external, both real and imagined, can lead to the establishment 
of a norm of full compliance, with perhaps perverse outcomes, and that in 
any event the majority of the contents of codes become akin to hard law, 
where deviation is not considered acceptable. There are however a very 
small number of rules where temporary deviation may be unavoidable from 
time to time and where non-compliance accompanied by a valid explanation 
is accepted. 
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1. Soft Law: Comply-or-Explain 
 
It is perhaps inevitable that crises lead to calls for better regulation of the actors 
involved, as can be witnessed in the debate over the global financial crisis. Such 
systemic crises are however, thankfully rare. On the other hand, corporate 
failure as the result of wrongdoing is a much more common event. Consider for 
example Polly Peck, BCCI, and Maxwell in the UK, Enron and World Com in 
the US, and Holzmann, Metallgesellschaft and Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank in Germany. These corporate scandals have given rise to calls for 
the establishment or refinement of the codes of corporate governance that are 
put in place to regulate corporate behaviour in general and the actions of 
company directors in particular. Such codes are either fully voluntary, e.g. the 
latest version of the UK the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 
2008), or contain voluntary and statutory elements, e.g. the latest version of the 
German code, Regierungskommission 2008 (referred to throughout as the 
‘Cromme’ code after the chair of the code commission). They may thus be 
considered either instruments of soft law or mixed soft and hard law. Within the 
code elements the individual rules themselves may be fixed or flexible – a mix 
of non-discretionary regulations and discretionary guidance and information on, 
for example, best practice. 
 
Proponents of soft law argue that it has that essential flexibility that hard law 
lacks and our innate desire to conform with social norms produces genuine 
compliance. Soft laws have been described as ‘rules of conduct which, in 
principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have 
practical effects’ (Snyder 1993:2). Although regulatees may choose to conform 
or not conform with soft law there is an assumption that behaviour is more 
likely to be consistent with codified guidance and statements of best practice 
than if such guidance and statements are not stated within the framework of a 
code. In this way non-binding rules can have the same political and social 
effects and benefits as hard law (Borchardt and Wellens 1989: 268). But, as 
Cini (2001) notes, because ‘soft law is not legally binding, implementation must 
rest solely on the goodwill of those agreeing to and affected by it’ and, 
presumably, where such goodwill is absent, soft law may well result in soft 
compliance.  
 
Even where goodwill and the desire to conform exist conformance may not be 
the best option for regulatees. They may determine that the principle 
underpinning a particular rule or guidance on best practice will, in their case, be 
best served by non-conformance – or they may be prevented from conforming 
for reasons outwith their control. This use of discretion to determine 
conformance or non-conformance can be invaluable, not only for regulatees, but 
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also for regulators. In this way a code can be both universal - ‘one size fits all’ 
and particularistic – customised to suit the regulatee’s particular circumstances. 
The concern of course is that the decision not to conform is made for narrow 
self-interested reasons that conflict with the principle underpinning the 
discretionary rule, rather than supporting it, so such decisions must be 
monitored and a determination made on whether the regulatee’s decision on 
action is indeed consistent with the regulatory objective. 
 
To enable monitors to function effectively in determining whether the reason 
given for non-conformance is acceptable regulatees must explain their actions in 
respect of any rule from which they have deviated. This process has become 
known as comply-or-explain. It is the cornerstone of modern codes of corporate 
governance. Statements of the extent of conformance with the code of 
governance and the reasons for any non-conformance are given in a corporate 
governance statement, which is contained, in some domains, within the annual 
report, or in others, published separately. These statements can then be 
monitored and assessed for validity by the various stakeholders. In the case of 
larger public companies such monitoring tends to be carried out by their major 
investors, typically major financial institutions, and by specialist ratings 
agencies, who tend to provide advice to medium sized investors such as 
individual pension funds and local governments. It may be expected that one 
impact of such monitoring is that there is considerable pressure to conform. 
However in a survey of compliance with codes of corporate governance  Seidl, 
Sanderson & Roberts (2009) found that just 51% of the 30 largest companies in 
the UK, and 40% of the 30 largest in Germany fully conformed with the code. 
This raises two separate but related questions: (i) to what extent do regulatees 
conform with soft regulation (addressed in Seidl, Sanderson & Roberts (2009), 
and (ii) why do they conform – or rather in what circumstances do they choose 
to conform and in what circumstances do they choose not to conform (addressed 
herein). Are such decisions common across domains and a function of time and 
the embeddedness of the code or are there significant differences arising from 
culture and tradition? Note that both choices, comply and explain, are 
essentially compliant in that the choice not to conform is equally acceptable 
under the code – subject ultimately to the agreement of monitors – which is why 
we generally use the terms conformance and non-conformance in this paper 
rather than compliance and non-compliance. (Indeed, for greater clarity the 
Dutch Tabaksblat Code (Commissie Tabaksblat 2003) refers to ‘apply or 
explain,’ a formulation favoured by leading authorities on UK corporate 
governance such as Ross Goobey (2005.) 
 
‘Comply’ or ‘explain’ can take a number of forms. Conformance, can mean 
strict adherence to the letter of the code or to the underlying principle, or both. 
For example, the German Cromme code (Regierungskommission 2005) 
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recommends the formation of a Prüfungsausschuss (an audit committee) as 
oversight of the audit process may be better effected by a smaller group than the 
whole supervisory board, but where the board is already small, for example in 
the case of a small company, this makes no sense, The underlying principle is 
already being met by the whole board overseeing auditing. On the other hand 
where age limits are required to be set by a code, setting a limit at 99 years 
might appear somewhat disingenuous. 
 
Non-conformance is generally justified by recourse to firm- or industry-level 
particularities or against the logic of certain code provisions. On the other hand 
explanations may simply be ‘empty.’ For example, in its 2005 annual report 
HypoVereinsbank AG justified its non-conformance with the code provision 
requiring that its directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance contains a 
deductible with the bland statement that, ‘responsible action is an understood 
duty of the members, no deductible is required for that’ (trans.). Similarly, in 
the UK, Camelot plc, in the compliance statement in its 2005 annual report, 
provides the following rather empty justification for four incidents of non-
conformance: ‘the exceptions are not viewed by the board to impact the quality 
of corporate governance, and arise from the unique nature of the company.’ 
 
 
2.Empirical Approach 
 
The principal focus in this paper is on the similarities and differences in 
directors’ perceptions of conformance and non-conformance and the factors that 
influence them. The formal statements regarding deviations and the 
explanations given are of secondary interest and have been addressed in Seidl, 
Sanderson & Roberts (2009). To clarify the extent to which social norms drive 
decisions on comply or explain we studied the perceptions of company directors 
and their senior legal advisors on corporate governance issues from amongst the 
130 largest listed firms in the two countries, the UK and Germany. These were 
sourced from FTSE250 in the UK and from the DAX30, MDAX and SDAX in 
Germany. There are of course a number of similarities and differences between 
the two countries which have contributed to the development of these norms. 
The UK is a common law liberal democracy while Germany is perhaps best 
characterised as a corporatist or social democratic state with a civil law 
tradition. Their different traditions and histories have resulted in different 
capital market structures and different legal conceptions of the responsibilities 
of the corporation. The UK has widely dispersed share ownership, outsider 
control and a unitary board. Germany has concentrated ownership, control by 
insider block-holders and a dual board structure which includes employee 
representatives. As a consequence the former emphasises a company’s 
responsibilities to its shareholders while the latter recognises that a company 
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has a duty to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders. The two 
countries do however have broadly similar codes of corporate governance and 
many of the largest companies in both countries trade globally so the 
differences may not be quite as significant as they first appear. Perhaps of equal 
significance is that the UK code was established in 1992, a decade before the 
German code, so comparing the perceptions of those concerned with 
discretionary compliance decisions in the two countries will provide a sense of 
how the use of comply-or-explain has evolved.  
 
The consequences of these differences with respect to the application of the 
principle of comply-or-explain were explored in a series of 48 interviews held 
during 2006 and 2007 in both countries. The interviews were semi-structured to 
allow for local variations in practice but followed common guidelines. The 
transcripts of the interviews were then analysed and codified using Weft QDA 
qualitative analysis software. While a majority of the German interviewees were 
employed by their companies as internal corporate lawyers and legal advisors 
(syndikus) interviews were also held with senior directors. Similarly, a majority 
of the British interviewees were employed as company secretaries. To 
familiarise themselves with the issues the interviewers also met with a number 
of investment managers, corporate governance advisors and academics - 
including some of those involved in drafting their respective codes. The extracts 
below have been anonymised in accordance with assurances given to 
interviewees. The source country is in most cases obvious from the surrounding 
text but to ensure clarity the letters U for UK or G for Germany have been 
appended. Note also that the UK interviews were conducted in English and 
most of the German interviews in German. Extracts in this paper from the latter 
are therefore translations. Code conformance was assessed with reference to the 
relevant version of the codes: The Combined Code 2006 and the Cromme code 
(Regierungskommission 2005). 
 
 
3.The UK and German Codes of Corporate Governance 
 
Codes of corporate governance have been defined as ‘non-binding set of 
principles, standards or best practices, issued by a collective body and relating 
to the internal governance of corporations’ (Weil et al., 2003). The first 
significant development of such a code arose in the UK In 1992 out of the 
report of the Cadbury Committee set up by the London Stock Exchange and the 
UK Financial Reporting Council. The code set out best practice for the directors 
of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Many of these original 
rules remain in force today, e.g.. ‘the roles of chairman and chief executive 
should not be exercised by the same individual’ (Cadbury 1992: A.2.1). The 
code and its subsequent elaborations in the Combined Code has been imitated 
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with suitable customizations in around fifty countries (van den Berghe and De 
Ridder 1999; Iskander et al. 2000; Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 2002; 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004).  Most draw upon either the Combined 
Code or the OECD ‘Principles of Corporate Governance,’ which provide 
guidelines for both OECD and non OECD countries (OECD 2004). The codes 
are remarkably similar. Indeed, The High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts (2002) found sufficient commonalities to recommend to the EU that it 
did not need to establish its own code of corporate governance but could instead 
rely on those established in the individual member states. 
 
The codes are typically issued by stock-exchange-related bodies, associations of 
directors, various types of investor groups, business and industry associations, 
and governmental commissions (Wymeersch 2005; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra 2004). They are aimed primarily at companies listed on their respective 
stock exchanges. Membership of such exchanges is generally conditional on 
observing the relevant code but while this is the only compulsion used in the 
UK, compliance with the Cromme Code is required under German corporate 
law (Aktiengesetz). Moreover, whereas the Combined Code, at least formally, is 
voluntary, the Cromme Code is a mix of rules with different bases: part hard 
law, part soft principles of best practice (most akin to the Combined Code) and 
part aspirations, for which neither conformance nor explanation is required. 
 
The current version of the Combined Code has developed from the original 
Cadbury Committee report on internal financial control in 1992, with 
subsequent contributions from Greenbury (1995) on disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration, Hampel (1998), consolidating previous provisions and further 
clarifying the roles of directors and shareholders, Turnbull (1999) on internal 
control procedures and Higgs (2003) on the role and duties of independent 
directors. All these took evidence from the key actors involved, particularly the 
directors of major companies. It is unsurprising therefore that many of the UK 
interviewees perceive the code as a reflection of established practice: 
 
“In many ways the Code came about from experienced City operators 
collaborating over what were the sort of elements that made companies 
operate well and effectively, trying to capture what until that time had 
actually been complicit in good management, and saying what are the 
signs of good management and how can we encapsulate that in a best 
practice guide as to how you should do something? So at the outset, yes, it 
was linked to previous scandals that had taken place but was as much 
about providing a useful tool to people (…) So it was built out of current 
best practice as opposed to being driven by a particularly political agenda 
or some other element extraneous to business itself. It came from within 
rather than from outside.” (U) 
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The way the code evolved discursively with input from practitioners, rather than 
by the imposition of rules from outside, was noted by several UK interviewees: 
 
 “The way it developed …  there was quite some time and debate before it 
was agreed that it should be adopted or tagged onto the listing rules and 
then worked through. Some of these things happen in the opposite 
direction but this was something that very much evolved.” (U) 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that regulatees feel they have 
dominated the development of the code, nor that they successfully constrained 
its scope through each iteration: 
 
 “ I have been around for a long time from, in the early days with very slim 
corporate governance type rules in the form of listing rules, through to 
where we are today, where we have got rather more regulation than is 
easy to cope with.” (U) 
 
Nonetheless, as the Combined Code has developed so has the attention paid to 
it: 
 
 “In the early days of the Code I just read through it and thought, yes that 
is alright. So nowadays it is more of a process, and it is more carefully 
considered, because it is taken more seriously by everybody as well.” (U) 
 
… and not just by the company lawyers charged with ensuring compliance: 
 
“I think it is heading in the right direction. I think it has been unfortunate I 
guess for all of my career that directors generally, I talk in general terms 
about directors of companies, have had to rely on someone like me to tell 
them what their duties are. They can read them for themselves now.” (U) 
 
This sense of ownership found in the UK contrasts with the development of the 
German code. The Cromme code is not understood as coming from 'inside'. The 
process in Germany has been dominated by committees that, while including 
some industry leaders, appear somewhat detached from the businesses to which 
the rules apply. Many interviewees felt excluded from the process of code 
development, particularly those working for smaller capitalised companies - 
those from the mid to lower end of the MDAX and SDAX. Many of the 
interviewees seemed to understand the Cromme Code not as discursively 
produced but rather as externally imposed An MDAX interviewee expressed a 
certain lack of awareness about the development of the code : 
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“At the time all the committees and expert groups met and came up with 
ideas about what to do with the issue of corporate governance in order to 
make Germany more attractive as a financial centre, as well as to increase 
the transparency of our companies. I and the whole company took a step 
back and waited for what will come. As lawyers my colleagues and I 
wondered about the novelty they wanted to tell us about with this code. (...) 
At some point it dawned on us that this is more than just a temporary fad, 
but something with a regulator, a clear task, pronouncements and public 
discussion. When we saw the code in its first draft, we said that we have no 
choice but to look deeper into it.” (G) 
 
The development of the Cromme Code is seen as being driven by both internal 
and external factors: 
 
“Obviously [the code] emerged because of the 'new market' and 
developments in other countries, but also in Germany. Failures, changes in 
the composition of shareholders, excessive option packages for executive 
board members, etc. - many things got out of balance … shareholders, 
supervisory board members, executive directors, partners, etc.” (G) 
 
Some of these factors are accepted as valid justifications while others are 
resented: 
 
“The topic of corporate governance started earlier in the Anglo-Saxon 
sphere: the Cadbury report and all the rest of it. And then one had the 
impression in Germany that one had to catch up; also because some 
investors asked for it. Or the other way round: because there were such 
initiatives in the Anglo-Saxon world and not around here some had the 
opinion that things [here] were a bit medieval. And then there was a 
McKinsey study that claimed that those who subscribed to corporate 
governance explicitly would have a 10 % higher market capitalisation. … 
But you have to take into account that the legal context in diverse countries 
is quite different. In Germany matters of corporate governance are much 
more regulated than in the Anglo-Saxon world. Insofar as there was more 
of a need for regulation it was in the Anglo-Saxon world rather than us.” 
(G) 
 
The former CEO of a large German bank also focused on the pressure from 
abroad that led to the development of the code: 
 
“There was an obvious coercion, a necessity to better demonstrate to 
foreign observers, foreign investors, and at the same time to seize the 
opportunity to reform a couple of things because one could constantly read 
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in the Anglo-Saxon media – not only in the tabloid press, but also in the 
academically inspired magazines – that in corporate governance terms 
[Germany] is a developing country. To oppose this view on the one hand, 
but also to develop what we had to develop on the other, were the primary 
objectives of corporate governance.” (G) 
 
This sense that the code is imposed from outside, that practitioners do not ‘own’ 
the code is reinforced by a rather formal process of continual development. One 
of those involved in the process commented: 
 
“It is a living document – it is a continuous government commission – we 
meet several times during the year and produce an annual update. It is on 
us whether or not and how often we change things. … Ideas and 
propositions are forwarded to an office which works as a kind of clearing 
house. Either they are collected there for the next meeting or if there is 
something immediate, they are circulated.  ... This will be discussed in 
detail at the meetings. There are two meetings where things are discussed 
pretty formally. Nobody is allowed to substitute for you. Either you are 
there or you are not. And then there is, from time to time, some informal 
discussion as well where people are asked what they think of this or that 
but I think the driving force is the central office.” (G) 
 
 This was elaborated upon by a different member of the commission: 
 
“The meetings are prepared by the commission staff. If necessary sub-
committees are established to examine in detail certain issues and report 
back at the next meeting. (...) Well, it is a multi-level operation; in the end 
there are three levels: the commission staff; perhaps sub-committees 
consisting of several commission members and chaired by one of their 
number; and lastly the full commission meeting in plenary session.” (G) 
 
The members of the commission were appointed by the German government. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the members themselves seemed convinced they 
constituted a cross-section of the relevant stakeholders. As one said: 
 
“Appointment was ad personam and because of that I think it was 
necessary to invite members one could expect to draw on considerable 
experience. To ensure a good balance of interests care was taken to select 
representatives from banks and the stock exchange on the one hand, and 
from academia on the other, thirdly from active entrepreneurs from large 
and smaller publicly listed companies. Overall I think what was achieved 
was the appointment of a balanced committee about which somebody from 
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the outside could not make allegations that particular interests were 
favoured.” (G) 
 
Some of the interviewees, however, did express strong criticism about the 
composition of the commission and indeed about whether the members had the 
required experience. One questioned the legitimacy of the process, describing it 
as:  
“absolute, without democratic control, without any feedback from 
companies ... by some professors of whom you don't know whether they 
ever have seen a company from the inside.” (G) 
 
Less dramatically those from smaller companies tended to perceive the code as 
being aligned more to the activities of larger companies and saw much of its day 
to day activities as irrelevant. One of the commission members responded to 
this point: 
 
“If we take one step back and ask about the primary rationale for the 
creation of the corporate governance commission in the first place, then it 
was certainly about considering the situation of larger companies as their 
external effects are far more significant than those of smaller ones. From 
this perspective an emphasis on the actions of the boards of larger 
companies is entirely justified. I would certainly admit that smaller 
companies, and in particular family run businesses, get a bit under 
pressure. On the other hand I would plead for maintaining this pressure as 
it is crucial for how we appear abroad. As a matter of fact, smaller and 
family run publicly listed companies are less numerous abroad compared 
to their larger counterparts.” (G) 
 
Many of the German participants emphasised the way the Cromme Code serves 
as a marketing tool to attract, and indeed educate, foreign investors: 
 
“This corporate governance code is a bureaucratic monster. The only 
good aspect – from my perspective – is that it explains very well the 
corporate legal structure of German publicly listed companies... the 
interaction between the annual general meeting, the executive board and 
the supervisory board. Something like corporate law for dummies - 
corporate law and German employees' participation for dummies. They 
achieved this and it is something worthwhile in order not to have to take 
on board every idiocy from the Anglo-Saxons, such as the one tier board 
structure. This is a major achievement of the corporate governance code. 
It is a successful marketing tool that has put many things into perspective 
and will ultimately assist with convergence of the systems.” (G) 
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… and … 
 
“The real purpose of the German corporate governance code is to 
advertise Germany as a capital market. And the two-tier board system is 
hard to explain to the Americans and English.  I think the code has fulfilled 
this task very, very well for our corporate governance system. Mostly the 
text simply restates [practice]. The first adaptation of the code was 
marginally new. It sets out the legal situation in very understandable 
language, both in German and English. It is a marketing tool for the 
German capital market.” (G) 
 
Overall the vast majority of UK interviewees perceived the process by which 
the code was originally developed and subsequently redeveloped to be inclusive 
and entirely legitimate. None of the interviewees complained their concerns 
went unheard and unanswered. Engagement was not considered an issue. This 
stands in contrast to the far more institutionalised process in Germany where 
self-regulatory codes are less common and soft law is, of course,  only one 
element in the Cromme code alongside statute law and guidance. Additionally 
the German code was created and put into practice over a comparatively short 
period and was instigated by government. It is therefore unsurprising that it is 
perceived more as an imposed set of enforced rules rather than a self-authored 
document at the heart of a self-regulatory system. This perception is reinforced 
by the existence of a permanent multi-level bureaucracy to oversee 
implementation and development of the code. It is easy to understand that such 
a heavily bureaucratic process can alienate some of the affected actors, 
particularly when they feel their type of company is under-represented, for 
example, smaller and family run firms.  
 
 
4.Perceptions of the Flexibility of the Codes and Comply-or-Explain 
 
These two different historic trajectories and levels of institutionalisation go 
some way towards explaining the different attitudes reported by UK and 
German interviewees towards their respective codes, and provides a basis from 
which to understand the different ways they perceive the comply-or-explain 
mechanism. In the UK non-conformance and thus explanation will only 
typically be utilised in respect of a very few code provisions by any one 
company, and full non-conformance is never considered to be an option – even 
by smaller companies. In Germany however cases of full non-conformance can 
be found and the average number of deviations by non-conformers was over 5, 
compared to 2 in the UK. It is worth noting however that the Combined code 
contains 48 provisions compared to 82 in the Cromme code although this 
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difference is accounted for mainly by the incorporation of statute law elements 
and guidance into the latter (see Seidl & Sanderson 2009). 
 
As a basis for understanding some of the differences in the approach taken to 
conformance in the two countries, interviewees were asked to reflect on the 
effectiveness of the code as a means of regulating the behaviour of companies. 
Most UK interviewees showed a degree of appreciation for the flexibility of soft 
law but were also well aware that such flexibility was limited: 
 
“I think it is a success, despite all of what I have said. It is not irrelevant, it 
isn’t, … [but] …. I don’t know of any people who have really explained on 
the big issues - you will comply. So it gives you flexibility at the margin but 
not in the main. I wonder what the margin is, is it 5%, is it 10%? It is 
flexibility in the trivia in there but the real core of it is not as flexible as 
comply-or-explain. That is what I am saying. It is comply. You will bloody 
comply because you will be out there being shot at if you don’t.” (U) 
 
Notwithstanding the perceived boundaries of comply-or-explain the mechanism 
as a core element of the Combined Code was generally considered to be a 
success: 
 “I think it has been a success and I think the comply or explain, or apply 
or explain, has been a success. If it had been a rigid requirement I think 
companies would not have enjoyed that. We ourselves may have found that 
we were being impeded in the way that we wanted to manage our 
business.” (U) 
 
The way that the code enabled a one size fits all approach was seen as a 
significant benefit: 
 
“[I]f you have hard law in an area then you are effectively supposing that 
the same model fits every company and of course even a hard law can have 
exceptions built into it. But if you use hard law and you put exceptions in, 
either the exceptions are so wide and discretionary as to negate the point 
of having the hard law or you have to be sufficiently detailed in your 
exemptions that you try to cover every particular case - which is equally 
difficult I think. Having seen it from the outside and now from the inside, I 
think the soft law actually works much better in this area. It is not like 
health and safety legislation. It is not like criminal law where something is 
obviously wrong and something is obviously right. It is a consensus as to 
this is the way we think things should be done but we are prepared to 
accept that for some companies it may be different and provided your 
explanation is adequate then you know you can carry your shareholders 
with you as it were.” (U) 
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The reference to the importance of context is significant. Comply-or-explain is 
not an especially common mechanism. It works in the context of corporate 
governance because the regulatees are relatively high profile and their actions 
are monitored by self-interested investors. In the UK these monitors are 
powerful financial institutions who have both the resources and interest to 
scrutinize boards’ decisions. They also have sufficient leverage to ensure their 
concerns are heard and are addressed. The mechanism is likely to be less 
effective in domains where monitoring is less intensive. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the government established a formal monitoring commission to 
examine explanations of non-conformance with their corporate governance code 
– recognition that monitoring was insufficient. 
 
A further benefit of the code and comply-or-explain mentioned by UK 
interviewees was the way that engagement with decisions on comply-or-explain 
encouraged a degree of reflexivity which in turn strengthened corporate 
accountability:  
 
“It is good that management are challenged to demonstrate that what they 
are doing is the right thing to do, that things they have done have been the 
right things to do, that they are tested by the appropriate standards rather 
than just regarding companies as a personal fiefdom. If you are the MD 
and you also own 51% then that is fine but if, like most managers, you are 
a professional manager rather than a major shareholder, being held 
accountable that way is right.” (U) 
 
Some interviewees went as far as to praise the Combined Code as a design 
template for the governance structures of publicly listed companies.  
 
 “I think the Combined Code has been very successful, from a number of 
perspectives I think. Perhaps at the outset it was looked on as being the 
standard to aspire towards but now I think it is very much more looked on 
as being a framework and, if you like, in some sense a minimum that 
people then operate to. But I think there is much greater recognition that 
good governance doesn’t spontaneously happen and therefore you need to 
have an approach which through time, through experience of operating 
with the Combined Code, has meant that most Boards and Directors and 
Chairmen now are starting from a much better position than they were 
before the first version of the Code came out” (U) 
 
Indeed, one of our interviewees described the code as a kind of manual: 
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“I think it is a success. I think you should look at it as a tool, not a 
restriction, but a tool of empowerment. If you look at it as something, well 
actually this is the way we are going to set up our Board, this is the way 
we are going to effectively manage our business, that should give you 
comfort that there is a way to do it properly. It doesn’t stop there being a 
bad apple in the box etc but I think it is workable.” (U) 
 
UK interviewees with dual listing status expressed, for the most part, a 
preference for the soft law approach found in the UK compared to the statutory 
approach adopted by the United States, especially since the advent of ‘Sarbanes-
Oxley’: 
 
“ I do think the comply or explain piece is a really valuable valve and I 
think, as I say, living with both sets of rules, the US rules and the comply 
or explain premise of the Combined Code, Boards get quite cross about 
having to comply with rules that are senseless in their view. So to have a 
best practice world that you can see that investors and others are 
expecting you to adhere to but having the flexibility to explain why an 
aspect might not be appropriate for you, I think is a really good place to 
be.” (U) 
 
Support for the code, however, is not unconfined. Some thought that the code 
had become too far-reaching, one interviewee describing it as only: 
 
“a qualified success probably. I regard it as being over-prescriptive and 
that is certainly the view round here.” (U) 
 
Another interviewee mentions that while comply-or-explain is a valuable 
mechanism the concept and its usage is not understood well by all monitors, 
some of whom treat non-conformance simply as non-compliance. For this 
reason the code may have: 
 
“ … to be redrafted because you are never going to get the box tickers who 
have now got departments full of people box ticking, they can’t take a view, 
they are incapable of reading the explanation and applying it. You haven’t 
got intelligent people doing these jobs who are able to say, ah in [this 
company]'s case, I have read the blurb, yes I agree with that. They are 
going to come from their position all the time.” (U) 
 
The institutionalisation of monitoring can also cause regulated companies to 
increase their monitoring of the monitors, with attendant increase in compliance 
costs: 
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“It is an industry in its own right. I am not sure it adds on a lot of value.” 
(U) 
 
Nonetheless, most UK interviewees were content with both the form of 
regulation (the Combined Code) and the principle and mechanism of comply-
or-explain. The situation in Germany however was more complicated. There 
were some positive evaluations of the code as a whole. The largest German 
companies, those with international operations, did not appear to find either 
compliance with the code, or utilising the comply-or-explain mechanism to be 
problematic: 
 
“comply-or-explain is actually a good method which precisely helps to 
realise the principles and recommendations. I would not wish lightly to do 
something as embarrassing as explaining a deviation but if I have a good 
reason for it I am not worried at all because this is what the code actually 
wants to achieve. You are allowed to deviate though you have to explain 
why. Then the audience should decide if the explanation is convincing or 
not …. From this perspective I do not see it as anything indecent to explain 
that we want one of our board members to become the chairman of the 
supervisory board because we have good reasons for it. We stand up for 
this and we do not perceive this as a flaw. And looking at the movement of 
our stock price, the audience agrees. (...) 'Explain or comply' is extremely 
important. People look at it and evaluate the explanation. And this is 
exactly how it is designed.” (G) 
 
Another interviewee agreed: 
 
“The recommendations … make perfect sense. And companies have the 
possibility of deviating if they announce this and explain in the 
[compliance] statement. I think this is very reasonable. From my 
perspective there is no reason for a company not to accept the code and 
apply it using comply-or-explain. This is the reason why we have this 
sensible book of rules in Germany. It is written in a way that every 
company can apply it.” (G) 
 
However a number of German interviewees were critical of the code. Some 
perceived the objectives of the code as either unattainable or irrelevant, or both:  
 
“If you lead your company well in principle you will not be able to achieve 
good corporate governance. If you lead your company well, with the help 
of all the tools one uses professionally nowadays, the actions the code 
prescribes become by-products. ... 90% are unimportant topics.” (G) 
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This point of view was fairly common, as was the notion that it was possible to 
comply with the letter of the code while perhaps paying less attention to the 
intention, the spirit of the code provisions. One interviewer made the point by 
reference to the Ten Commandments!: 
 
“Well, this is a similar question to whether the Ten Commandments make 
sense if people don't stick to them. OK, the minister of course says 'yes' 
because if the Commandments did not exist then everything would be 
worse. The corporate governance code makes sense by its principles. But 
what do you understand by principles? Reasonable corporate governance. 
We subscribe to these principles. I think this makes sense and is not 
without effect. Nevertheless, I have to say – and this is brought out in the 
bible – you have to distinguish between being correct to the letter of law, 
in a Pharisaical sense, and being right not only to the letter but also to the 
meaning of the law – really being good. There is a difference. You can 
comply to the letter of the corporate governance code and everybody says 
that is ok, but in fact you may not have complied to the meaning of it.” (G) 
 
The extent to which individual decision-makers embrace the spirit rather than 
merely the letter of the code is, in the end, a reflection of their own sense of 
responsibility on the matter: 
 
“One of the basic problems of all those corporate governance codes is, 
and it does not matter whether you take Hampel, Cadbury, Greenbury, 
Higgs, all the French Guys, Blue Ribbon, and all the rest of them or the 
Cromme commission: in the end one attempts to increase measurability by 
increasing the degree of formalisation. In the end, governance is the action 
of individuals and values of individuals. One has to be aware of that no 
matter how much you codify.” (G) 
 
The values underpinning the code provisions were not shared by all the German 
interviewees. One expressed his admiration of the CEO of Porsche, Wendelin 
Wiedeking, the enfant terrible of German corporate governance:  
 
“I am impressed by Mr. Wiedeking. I like the way he resists complying 
with the rules. I do not think Mr. Cromme is completely honest. You just 
have to look at what happened within Volkswagen. There is no mentioning 
in the code that the board is not allowed to visit a brothel with the 
employees representatives!”(G) 
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Quite a few were openly hostile to codes of corporate governance as a whole: 
 
“The attempt to find regulations that determine how all companies can be 
managed is doomed to fail. If you had told me before about such a project, 
I would have told you that I knew how this would end up: This would end 
up in blah blah regulations without any significance.” (G)  
 
As already noted, a major difference with the UK Combined Code, and a major 
issue with the German development process, is that the Cromme Code is 
understood by many medium-sized and smaller public companies as something 
that has been imposed on them from outside – something over which they feel 
little sense of ownership and can exercise little influence. It is therefore 
perceived by some as lacking legitimacy. It is moreover seen as a political 
project. Critics identified two main specific areas of grievance: the publication 
of the salaries of board members, and the whole field of employee 
representation on the board. The latter has not been seen as an issue in the UK, 
where there is no right of employee representation and where for many years 
directors’ salary arrangements have been published in the accounts section of 
the annual report of public companies as part of the financial reporting 
requirements. However, in Germany in the late 1990s there was a sustained 
campaign by some news media for disclosure of the remuneration of board 
members and senior management. This debate became difficult for the Cromme 
commission to resist and they added remuneration disclosure to the corporate 
governance code. This has not however been well-received by board members. 
Many perceive its inclusion as a form of invasion of privacy driven by envy and 
it reinforces for many the perception that the code lacks the requisite degree of 
legitimacy it should command from those affected. Some interviewees 
expressed incomprehension that such a provision should have been included in 
the code: 
 
 “In Germany there is a clear misunderstanding in respect of the 
disclosure of salaries. The disclosure of salaries is towards the 
stockholders. Dear stockholder, your board cost this amount. But our 
discussion is not about what the shareholder should know in order to make 
an investment decision, but rather to satisfy the curiosity of those who do 
not own shares. The public does not have such a right. You cannot deduce 
such a right from anywhere. Why should it have such a right? But in 
Berlin, the government brings up this topic over and again. If you do not 
make this public – to the general public – via the corporate governance 
code, we will impose it by law. This is a perversion. The whole thing about 
corporate governance is about the trust of the capital market.” (G) 
 
and: 
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“The obligation to publish [salaries]is absurd because it is not the public's 
business. This is an internal legal relationship between the owner of a 
company and their employees, the managers. And if somebody wants to 
make this public he can request it at the annual general meeting and the 
annual general meeting can decide on it.” (G) 
 
But, while not necessarily agreeing with disclosure some thought demands for it 
were understandable:  
 
“You have to see that there are so many other interests at stake. I think as 
a journalist or a media guy I would demand this strongly because I know 
that several times a year I can fill a whole page reporting on issues people 
are interested in.” (G) 
 
and 
 
“[Cromme’s] influence is very strong as the chair of the commission 
because, in conjunction with the Department of Justice - the commission is 
an instrument of the Department of Justice – he aimed to press ahead with 
the reforms as much as possible and as much as necessary. He had to (...) 
tackle unpleasant topics …. and to propose regulations that would find a 
large measure of agreement. One could not have left open hot issues such 
as the remuneration of the board members which rightly or wrongly were 
fiercely discussed in the public arena. You could not have said that this 
issue is insignificant. Because of the strong public interest the commission 
had to propose something.” (G) 
 
In terms of employee representation many interviewees criticised the code for 
ignoring the issue: 
 
“The law[on employee representation] is from 1976; it is 30 years old. To 
impose on companies a completely new understanding of corporate 
governance while ignoring employees’ representation is a design flaw.” 
(G) 
 
In fact several interviewees expressed their frustration at the fact that the code 
drafters chose to ignore the paradox that employee representatives could follow 
their own narrow sectional interests while the code required other members of 
the board to demonstrate independence and responsibility for the strategic 
direction of their company: 
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“[T]he independence of the members of the supervisory board is 
important. (...) Second, the topic of competence. For instance financial 
expertise is important in the sense that members of the supervisory board 
are responsible for the well-being of the company. This is of course 
important. But what about employee representatives? They are neither 
independent, nor competent, nor do they feel responsible for the well-being 
of the company.” (G) 
 
Some blamed the political nature of the Cromme commission for this: 
 
“What is interesting about the corporate governance commission is that 
the issue of employee participation was and is excluded from discussion. 
Without any doubt this is a birth defect. We have to thank politics for that 
because politicians did not want this as an issue of corporate governance – 
which is a German particularity and needs re-assessing. … Nonetheless I 
have always endorsed the presence of the labour unions on the 
commission. Their contribution is constructive and valuable. It is the case 
that we have this particular issue of corporate governance in Germany 
because we have employee representation on the supervisory board. It 
would be absurd not to let the labour unions take part in discussions on 
questions of company law.” (G) 
 
Another participant was however less phlegmatic about the presence of labour 
representatives on the Cromme commission: 
 
“I perceived this of course very awkwardly and bitched about it a little, but 
the task of the commission was not changeable. It was laid down by the 
federal government. The commission was not allowed to deal with the 
issue of employee participation. It is a bit like you are dealing with the 
topic of hunting but you are not allowed to talk about guns... and this is 
still the case. That means that labour unions ensure the topic of employees' 
participation is left out [of discussions]. And I really don't like that.” (G) 
 
Overall, the emphasis in the interviews in Germany seemed to focus more on 
substantive issues of content, both what was included - such as directors’ 
liability insurance and ‘staggered’ boards - and what was excluded – employee 
representation - rather than was the case in the UK where most felt the content 
was acceptable or that  comply-or-explain offered sufficient flexibility where it 
was not. Nonetheless several UK interviewees mentioned substantive issues 
including the definition of independence of non-executive directors and rules on 
the composition of sub-committees such as the remuneration committee (which 
were amended shortly after the interviews took place). Such issues were 
generally dealt with by use of comply-or-explain, with only minimal criticism 
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from shareholders.  In Germany the situation was similar although there was 
less experience, and therefore less understanding, of self-regulation and 
comply-or-explain. 
 
 
5.Compliance Reporting 
 
We now turn to the process of compliance reporting. Our interest here is to 
assess whether there are any significant differences of approach that might 
impact on the decision to comply or to explain. During the interviews we asked 
about the resources devoted to compliance and compliance reporting. This 
varied but almost all considered the resources required to be reasonable. Few at 
board level spent much of their own time dealing with compliance matters. In 
both countries lawyers seemed to dominate, and indeed own the process 
internally, although the board took ultimate responsibility and senior board 
members, particularly the CEO and chairman, would often be involved in 
conversations on governance issues with their company secretary (UK) or legal 
counsel (Germany). 
 
Much of the process of reporting compliance is entirely routine: 
 
“I will look at last year’s, I am not going to reinvent the wheel, I will look 
at the criticisms that have been made of last year’s …. [and] will then look 
at it from […] the accuracy point of view but that is just inevitable. Then I 
am tempted not to make many changes to be honest. I don’t get much 
feedback on it.” (U) 
 
Another company secretary similarly describes the process as continual. He 
additionally refers to external actors (auditors and lawyers) being involved in 
the process: 
 
“I find that at this level Chairmen are relying on their Co Secs to - it is 
only where you have got problems do Chairmen start to get interested in 
this area. (...) My previous experience is there are a number of 
requirements coming from a number of different directions as to what 
needs to go into a Directors report, not least the Companies Act which 
obviously is transitioning from the ‘85 Act to the 2006 Act, and the listing 
rules, and Directors remuneration requirements and all this sort of stuff. 
So there are huge checklists of things that have to go into it. You always 
start with last year’s and modify accordingly and then tick it off against all 
the requirements. Obviously you have got lawyers involved as well who 
look at it, as well as the auditors, and our own people.” (U) 
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The timing of preparing the corporate governance compliance statement is 
dictated by the company’s financial year end and is timetabled accordingly. 
Most companies seemed to follow the same sequential process: 
 
“The initial draft was then obviously prepared and circulated to the Board 
and the Board members, well internally first through relevant interested 
parties here from a range of different parts of the organisation. Then 
through the Board for comment and input and then revised accordingly 
and then produced for final sign-off by the Board as part of the Annual 
Report process. We also check it against the auditors obviously, who have 
to look at it, for their purpose there were certain aspects, and our external 
lawyers as well from their point of view. The process of drafting it, I would 
take into account current comment, best practice out in the market, looked 
to see what others were doing as well in terms of evaluating how people 
are reporting on some of these things.” (U) 
 
and: 
 
“It is a much more iterative process, I would be aghast if anything came to 
our Board and they said we had better check the Combined Code on this. 
Because the way it happens is once a year, at least once a year, and it 
happens more often in our case, but at least once a year, I present to the 
Board a whole compendium of our governance arrangements. One of the 
things that I do in compiling that, in presenting it, is I set out the Combined 
Code, and then in another column I set out how we are complying with it 
and areas where we may or may not need to explain. We do that once a 
year so the Board has uppermost in its mind what the provisions in the 
Combined Code are, it is not something that is out there and they never see 
it. So they see it at least once a year. (...) So there is never any question of 
putting the cart before the horse here because the Board and the 
Committees are fully aware of good governance, of what is in the 
Combined Code. It does influence what decisions they may make but it is 
only an influence.” (U) 
 
Many also kept a watching brief on the actions of their boards throughout the 
year: 
 
“Clearly the Board is aware of the Combined Code but it is really my role 
to remind them as they go through meetings and other issues day to day, 
for me to remind them that the Combined Code requires us to do certain 
things. If for any reason we decide to deviate from the Code it would just 
be made clear that we will have to disclose it, and we will have to explain 
the reasons, and then the Board will discuss and agree, yes, they are 
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comfortable with the explanation and they feel that the explanation fully 
justifies it. That will be minuted usually and then obviously when we come 
to do the review at the end of the year, the corporate governance review, 
then we would include an explanation at that time. So the Board would be 
aware of it, the Board will be made aware that it was a deviation.” (U) 
 
Notwithstanding the differences in board structure between the UK (single) and 
Germany (dual) there were few major differences in the way equivalent German 
interviewees perceived the process. In Germany the executive board usually 
takes the lead on corporate governance. A supervisory board member described 
the process, insofar as it affected the supervisory board, as minimal: 
 
“Well, this is a topic discussed in the last meeting of the supervisory board 
(...) and the responsible specialist of the executive board – mostly working 
in the general secretariat, or whatever you want to call it these days – 
presents to us where we comply and where we do not. He also reports 
whether there have been substantive changes – either positive or negative 
– on the issues we deal with. And then there is normally a very short 
discussion.” (G) 
 
Asked for his role in the process of reporting compliance another member of a 
supervisory board replied that: 
 
“… no member of the supervisory board would do that. It is the 
administration of the supervisory board that takes care of it. The 
supervisory board takes care of the substance of the company’s business, 
but not of the procedural issues. (...) The way to come up with decisions 
within the supervisory board is that decisions are prepared by the 
chairman as well as by the executive board. There are draft resolutions. 
There is not really much to decide anymore. As a member of the 
supervisory board you get everything prepared and spoon-fed. You don't 
have the time to critically discuss issues or to change them in the way one 
might think from the outside. This is not possible in terms of time because 
there are so many things to decide upon. (...) The supervisory board is a 
very formalised committee in which very few things are argued about. That 
might be different in the executive board in the sense that there is more 
discussion between the members. But the supervisory board is a external 
control committee of people with limited access to information which only 
vaguely keeps track of what really happens inside the company and which 
plays a role mainly in the strategic decision making.” (G) 
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The resources allocated by some executive boards were quite substantial. Some 
set up a separate office to deal with ensuring compliance and preparing the 
compliance statement: 
 
“At the beginning the secretariat of the executive board carried it out but 
then we set up a compliance office. We have outsourced it; it has become a 
separate, independent department which deals with questions of 
compliance, also with insider rules and the time frame for buying and 
selling of [our] stock by the members of the supervisory board. It is 
responsible for the whole technical aspects of corporate governance and 
makes sure all processes are undertaken appropriately and looks out if 
there might be conflicts of interest – already pre-emptively – and contacts 
the people, etc. ” (G) 
 
Family dominated public companies are something of a rarity in the UK but are 
quite common in Germany. For such companies corporate governance is not a 
priority, let alone compliance with a code of corporate governance, and may be 
treated more or less as an irrelevance as one member of a family dominated firm 
listed on the SDAX recounted: 
 
“I am responsible for the draft of the annual report, generally for the 
whole communication with shareholders. That means that I have to draft 
the corporate governance statement. I do this with the lawyer, Dr. ----. We 
look at the deviations, formulate them, give the statement to the 
supervisory board who then decide upon it. We spend five minutes on it in 
the meeting of the supervisory board. We spend another hour drafting it. 
As I said already, I have to admit that this is pretty pointless for us. (...) 
The [company] is very anti-bureaucratic. [The head of the family] hates 
this kind of stuff: ‘I do not think much of this body of regulations and I 
don't see why I should stick to these rules.’” (G) 
 
 In general the administrative overhead arising from the ongoing provision of 
advice and preparation of the annual corporate governance statement is not 
considered excessive although the process is more standardized in the UK than 
in Germany and larger companies have a more formalised process in place 
while smaller companies tend to rely on external advisers. 
 
 
6.To Comply or to Explain: a Stratified Code 
 
The addition of comply-or-explain to a code of corporate governance enables a 
regulated company to (i) demonstrate it has complied directly with the rule; (ii) 
demonstrate it has complied by some alternative means with the underlying 
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explicit or implicit principle on which the rule is based; (iii) explain why 
compliance with the rule (and any underlying principle) is not possible or is not 
in the interests of the shareholders. In order to better understand the drivers for 
conformance and more especially non-conformance interviewees were engaged 
in conversation on their practice when dealing with issues of non-conformance, 
either from their own experience or their understanding of the issues faced by 
others. One immediate difference in this regard between the UK and Germany 
is that self-regulation and the use of codes as regulatory strategy have long 
histories in the UK, and in particular in the City of London. There is a what 
might be termed a ‘code culture’ to be found in the City which influences the 
way that business as a whole deals with issues of governance: 
 
“If you look at the way the City has operated since the ‘60s when the 
takeover panel was first really constituted, you know, a uniquely British 
institution if you like, it is a non-statutory body, there is no law that says it 
can do this, there is no regulation that says it can do this, but everyone 
among the great and the good got together and said something must be 
done. So in our British way we all agreed that this is what we would do 
and anyone who didn’t want to play by the rules, we wouldn’t play with 
them.” (U) 
 
Others spoke about the 'spirit' of the code, something far less tangible than the 
letter of the law, and something that required a considerable degree of 
engagement and reflexivity: 
 
“I think codes, as opposed to legislation, in my view are supposed to have 
a degree of flexibility built within them which enables people to […] 
comply with the spirit as well as the letter. So in some ways they can be 
more onerous because if you are applying that sort of ‘spirit’ test, that 
sometimes does drive you to some harder choices than the ‘letter of the 
law’ test.” (U) 
 
Engagement with the 'spirit' of the law brings with it responsibility and 
accountability: 
 
“It is very easy to write down something, thou shalt do this and that, and 
you won’t do that and the other. If you quote something which is grey it 
requires interpretation and if you have got latitude, then responsibility and 
accountability comes with it doesn’t it? I think where there are areas of 
interpretation we would consider pretty carefully what that interpretation 
should be. It may well be more onerous and, as I say, it is very easy to say, 
ok black is black, and white is white, and which side do you fall, but if 
there is something which is grey, you are left, and I think, a lot of 
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companies would default to the more difficult position sometimes, maybe 
not always. I think obeying the spirit, it can be relaxing as well but I also 
think it can bring with it a greater burden.” (U) 
 
However, some of the UK interviewees yet again spoke of the importance of 
authorship, of making a genuine contribution to the code – not by way of an 
explicit contribution perhaps but by the way those who drafted and periodically 
revise the code incorporate best practice within the code provisions: 
 
“I don’t think the Code sets best practice, I think that would be wrong. I 
think the beauty of the Code is it does follow best practice. Who on earth is 
going to actually prescribe to us what best practice is?” (U) 
 
Flexibility of the code is seen by some of the UK interviewees as a two way 
street. Not only can companies use the flexibility of comply-or-explain but if 
the code is to retain its legitimacy with regulatees then it too must be flexible 
and adjust to reflect best practice where the code has either failed to capture 
such practice within its provisions or where best practice itself changes: 
 
“I think a lot of it is best practice anyway. Some of the ridiculous things 
like you couldn’t have the Chairman sitting on the Remuneration 
Committee previously, and they got rid of that because actually that was a 
ridiculous thing. People said well ok we won’t have the Chairman on the 
Remuneration Committee but for obvious reasons he should be there in 
attendance and eventually they changed it because it just wasn’t sensible. 
Everybody was saying, oh god, the original Higgs Report said the 
Chairman should not Chair the Nominations Committee which we all 
thought was daft. If that had have gone through we would have probably 
had the SID chairing the Nominations Committee but we lobbied hard, 
along with a lot of other companies, and they got rid of it. So I think that 
there has been some sort of credence taken of what business thinks about 
it.” (U) 
 
There is a practical side to creating and retaining a sense of ownership of a code 
- regulatees need to have reasonable access to those carrying out revisions to the 
code: 
 
“My own experience of codes has been that it is actually very easy to get to 
the people who draft them so if you want to understand the spirit of them it 
is actually quite easy. In previous times I have been heavily involved in the 
drafting of the Banking Code and I found them very accessible. If you want 
to actually make changes, where you find parts of a code that don’t work 
so well, because they tend to have a review every 3 years, you can 
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normally get things changed more easily. Somehow they feel more 
tangible”. (U) 
 
There is also a practical side to a one size fits all code: 
 
“A few years ago there were a plethora of codes coming out and every 
major institutional shareholder felt that it ought to have its own statement 
of principles or code and therefore measure the report against that. So you 
would end up with a pile of codes and you would say, well, they are all 
trying to get to the same place, and if we don’t meet some of these, people 
are going to potentially take issue with it, but I think having gone that way 
I think they have pulled back from that a lot now, or there is different 
emphasis. Morley [an investment company] may have a particular view on 
remuneration or types of remuneration plans but generally they are all 
working under the ambit of the Combined Code and therefore it becomes 
much more easy to deal with.” (U) 
 
The point was made by several UK interviewees that not only have companies 
adjusted to the Combined Code and learned to use its flexibility but also the 
monitors have come to accept the code as the primary standard for corporate 
governance and are becoming used, over time, to the use of explanation for 
deviation where this can be demonstrated to have been applied responsibly: 
 
“People did go down the route of saying, the Code is the standard, if you 
don’t meet the Code then, by definition, you are not meeting the standard 
and therefore that is a black mark against you. There has been a lot of 
debate by Higgs and everybody else about trying to get away from that and 
I think most serious investors now are away from that. There is not a knee 
jerk reaction. You may be not complying with the Code but that doesn’t 
mean that anyone is going to automatically mark you down accordingly. It 
may be a flag is raised to explain that there may be some discussion round 
it but it is not going to be a significant problem.” (U) 
 
The same interviewee also emphasised the normative aspect of the combined 
code: 
 
“I think one’s perception of the Code as being, as we have seen it move 
from being a guidance document to then being incorporated by reference 
into the listing rules, it is not directly regulation but it is regulation in a 
way and therefore you would be expecting people to be complying to that if 
there is no good reason not to, but I don’t think it loses its value 
necessarily because of that. (...) I think it is helpful for people to have some 
clarity around the framework and then they work through the behaviours 
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that are required for it. I think it is because the Code itself is reflective of 
the general market perception about what is a reasonable framework 
within which to be operating.” (U) 
 
However, it may be that a company’s experience of codes that do not 
incorporate comply-or-explain in other areas of its business can affect its 
approach where such flexibility exists. Although this interviewee was at pains to 
demonstrate that both the Code and hard regulation were treated with equal 
seriousness, the language used – talk of breach and penalties – would seem to 
suggest an aversion to any position other than a norm of full compliance: 
 
“In principle, day to day I don’t think people say, oh that is a rule and that 
is a code and therefore I am going to ignore that. From my experience in 
compliance, when we had the Mortgage Code and we had the Banking 
Code and we had the ABI codes prior to some of the more detailed FSA 
regulation, they were enshrined in our business processes and people 
adhered to them. I guess if it ever came to a situation where you were 
thinking, well I can do this or I can do that, clearly the penalties for breach 
of regulation are greater, and the potential reputational risks are greater, 
so if you had to, for any reason, prioritise, you would always adhere to 
regulation first.” (U) 
 
Thus for many the default behaviour, the norm, is to comply fully, wherever 
possible : 
 
“What we feel at the moment is that sometimes we are being backed into a 
corner slightly. […] Our starting point is always we comply with the 
Combined Code, and we do fully support it, but if there are situations 
where we do feel that it is in the interests of the business to do something 
different then the Board is comfortable with doing something different and 
then I think they do just get a bit irritated when that is misinterpreted.” (U) 
 
Others go further and perceive the Code as de facto hard law: 
 
“It is not a comply or explain in reality. It is not equal weighting comply 
or explain. It’s thou shalt comply and at the periphery you can explain 
away. (...) [I]t’ s comply, you will bloody comply because you will be out 
there being shot at if you don’t. On that basis it could be codified. It could 
be really codified and made legal and have no real impact because you 
probably wouldn’t put into law some of the margin that people explain 
away because it would just be (...) Yes, so some of that sort of stuff you 
wouldn’t put into law. But the bits that were put into law, if they said to me 
tomorrow it was going to become legal to do X, Y and Z, and those are the 
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core, I wouldn’t have a problem because I would never thinking of 
explaining. Yet you sucker people into this thing that they can comply or 
explain, and everybody talks about the freedom to comply or explain, peer 
pressure doesn’t let you explain on the major stuff.” (U) 
 
So for this interviewee the perception of comply-or-explain is just that – a 
perception. On this reading any sense of code legitimacy based on its potential 
flexibility may be comforting but is false. He is not alone: 
 
“No, you might get away with minor omissions on a comply or explain 
basis like you have forgotten to have a meeting of the Non-Execs without 
the Chairman. Something relatively trivial you could get away with but 
most of it is I think actually pretty hard law, I don’t think it is a Code at 
all. (...) We don't regard it as Code, we regard it as something we have to 
comply with. (...) I think it has evolved from kind of soft law to hard law for 
people like us. We actually don’t see it materially different to, the 
consequences of not complying are a bit different, but I don’t think we 
necessarily see it any different to the listing rules or the disclosure rules or 
the Companies Act. It is another lump of stuff we have to comply with.” 
(U) 
 
Several interviewees then saw the Code as offering very little opportunity for 
flexibility from which one may conclude that the code contents are becoming 
ossified: 
 
 “So, ok, there is some soft stuff and some encouragements here and there 
but most of what is in the Combined Code is hard law and a lot of it now, 
because this is 4 years old, is now taken as motherhood and apple pie. You 
wouldn’t dream of not having an independent Audit Committee or an 
independent Remuneration Committee, or a Nomination Committee that 
isn’t composed of Chairman, NEDs and CEO, which I have a slight issue 
with. The world has kind of moved on, I think this is now entrenched and 
most people would not argue with most of it.” (U) 
 
This is seen as being at odds (not necessarily correctly) with the original 
intentions of the Cadbury Committee: 
 
“It is sort of fine in the sense that it has been in place for a few years now, 
people sort of understand the nuances, people understand where they can 
flex and where they can’t, and I think people are now happy with it. There 
were all sorts of sharp intakes of breath when it was brought in. (...) To the 
extent we are not allowed to exercise the discretion that the original 
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writers of the Combined Code intended because the market won’t let us.” 
(U) 
 
Some even fear that the increasing pressure on larger companies to fully comply 
may lead eventually to the comply-or-explain mechanism falling into disuse: 
 
“I think there probably is a tendency (...) that the FTSE 100 companies 
have become more and more compliant. My concern, as I keep telling my 
Company Secretary friends, is don’t comply the whole time because 
otherwise you will end up losing that right to explain. I think, I really do 
think that right is valuable and I think particularly with what is happening 
in Europe, in a way if you can’t see responsible use of the flexibility of 
comply or explain, I think the trend will be that you will lose it and there 
will just be rules and I think that will be a huge error. So I keep 
encouraging my friends not to comply.”(U) 
 
Almost all the UK interviewees reported this movement towards full 
compliance. In a sense what we can observe is a process of internalisation of 
rules. Rather than by force of law, the actors on the capital markets are 
perceived to produce a punitive environment that encourages full compliance as 
the only acceptable position. It forces companies, particularly large companies, 
to comply fully with the norms set out within the code: 
 
“I think the principle of comply or explain, it is fair to say it is designed to 
allow people the flexibility and I think, as I say, depending on your sector, 
how that sector is perceived, and how big you are, there is some flexibility. 
But if you are a FTSE 100 there is no flexibility. You are expected to 
comply and the institutional investors will put pressure on you if you 
don’t.” (U) 
 
Others agree: 
 
“I think for a company like [us], and indeed probably for most other FTSE 
100 companies, comply or explain is a bit of a myth because compliance is 
effectively mandatory. (...) So there are some exceptions but in neither of 
those cases material exceptions. So I think for a 100 FTSE,… full 
compliance is effectively required.” (U) 
 
Some even spoke of a 'culture of compliance' among their peers in the FTSE 
100. On the other hand, the pressure does not only come from monitors or 
peers: 
“Yes, I suppose it depends to some extent on how the auditors work. I 
know ours last year certainly worked from a checklist and they went 
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through the Code and if there was anything where you weren’t slap bang 
in the middle of it they would put, ‘breach.’ It really infuriated me and I 
spent quite a long time with them trying to explain how the Code worked.” 
(U) 
 
And the media are seen to contribute to this punitive environment: 
 
“I am quite surprised how reluctant people are [to explain rather than 
conform] and I guess it is because they have got more experience of the 
media probably to step out of line. So I think that conformity is quite 
strong. I guess it comes back to reputation probably, not wanting to stick 
your head above the parapet unless you absolutely have to.” (U) 
 
However, the extent to which the punitive nature of the environment is real or 
imagined may be open to question. Institutional investors may be far more 
accepting of deviations, accompanied by valid explanations, than board 
members believe. To inform the research a number of institutional investors 
were interviewed, one of whom put it thus :  
 
“I was astonished that they spent so much time box ticking.  That's how I 
would describe it. [Board members] didn't imagine that there was any 
institutional flexibility, and that really, I couldn't understand that.  They 
spent a lot of time talking about independence of non-executives, 
particularly about tenure.  You know they were saying, ‘I've got a 
wonderful non-exec, he's been on the board for nine years, he’s just 
tremendous and now we've got to get rid of him because he's past nine 
years and those [institutional investors], they've created a rod for their 
own backs because they're getting rid of the good people.’ And one by one 
we were all putting up our hands saying, ‘If he's good - keep him, that's 
fine, and if you have to make him non-independent then you make him non-
independent, but it's not a problem, and if you have a board which is non- 
independent because of that guy and you don't want to get somebody else 
in - then fine, just explain’. ‘ No, no, no, no, no [they said], we have to get 
rid of him.” (U – institutional investor) 
 
Of course there is a transaction cost to be taken into account when explaining 
rather than conforming: 
 
“It is much better to fall in the pack, and I am talking about companies 
generally, than to stand out on a trivial point. Why explain something that 
really doesn’t matter because you are going to devote a lot more 
management effort to that explanation and defending that position than 
you are simply to comply.” (U) 
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Overall, UK interviewees, perhaps incorrectly, felt considerable pressure on 
them to demonstrate full compliance. While many wish to retain the essential 
flexibility of the code, their preference for full compliance actually serves to 
weaken the justification for retaining comply-or-explain. Almost all 
interviewees treated code compliance with the same diligence as they would 
hard law - perhaps because they were wary of what they perceived as the 
punitive environment they inhabited. There is something distinctly Foucauldian 
about their behaviour – there is little evidence that monitors are actually 
increasing the pressure for full compliance. In fact some of the interviewees 
themselves noted increased understanding amongst stakeholders of the 
responsible use of flexible compliance – in other words that non-conformance is 
not necessarily considered by monitors to be synonymous with non-compliance. 
Nonetheless the interviewees seemed to have internalised this need for full 
compliance and displayed little resistance. It has become for those who have 
already demonstrated full conformance an habitual value and for those who 
have not yet attained full conformance, an aspiration. On the other hand if the 
code really does enshrine contemporary best practice then full conformance 
ought in any case to be the default position, with a few rare temporary 
deviations to accommodate unavoidable circumstances such as the unexpected 
departure of a director. Where the code does not enshrine accepted best practice 
substantial deviations may occur, to which the monitors may acquiesce (as was 
seen over the composition of the nomination and remuneration committees). 
Perhaps the lesson from the UK’s 15 years experience of comply-or-explain is 
that it provides regulatees with a possibly illusory sense of control over the 
governance of their companies. The great majority of the contents of the code 
become akin to hard law. Deviation is simply not acceptable. These form the 
bedrock of the code. A second smaller stratum of rules may have been or 
become sub-optimal and following substantial deviation may be amended and 
amalgamated into the first lower stratum.  The final stratum consists of rules 
such as board independence where temporary deviation may be unavoidable 
from time to time. 
 
Turning to the German interviews a number of respondents considered 
preparing for implementation of the Cromme code was important: 
 
“We try to take the role of early mover (...) From our perspective this is an 
advantage as one can influence one thing or another. (...) We know no one 
in the commission, but nevertheless I think that if one undertakes this well 
in advance you always have a chance to influence...if only because one is 
perceived as a company that implements things from the very beginning.” 
(G) 
 
31 
 
and: 
 
“Yes, we try to anticipate the developments in large part and internally be 
ready for them and to manifest this inside the company. I think this is 
better for the company than to run after and implement those things ex post 
which the lawmakers or commissions set up for companies.” (G) 
 
 Another interviewee placed emphasis on consent. According to him this was 
the precondition for the working of the code itself because only via consent 
could one create legitimacy: 
 
“A voluntary code lives to a certain degree by consent. You cannot push 
something through like one can via law where you have all the sanctions of 
penal law available.” (G)  
 
While feedback and consent are considered necessary for creating legitimacy, 
cost was also a major issue for the German interviewees. The increased cost of 
compliance with a further set of rules can, if monitoring and enforcement is 
insufficient, lead to lower compliance rates, especially where such rules are 
considered overly burdensome and/or unnecessary: 
 
“There are plenty of statutory rules. We should not overload this. I think it 
is good to summon companies to engage in a reasonable dialog with their 
investors and with the public, but the subject should not be overloaded. We 
are already challenged with lots of other new regulations which cost time 
and money and cause a lot of administration.” (G) 
 
Another interviewee mentioned in this context that a period of stability was now 
needed to enable companies to embed the various changes made to date: 
 
“We should now say – and I am here in tune with colleagues from other 
companies – that we have a book of rules that we should allow to settle. 
We do not need any more changes. We have now something reasonable. 
We should let that settle and not come up with new ideas every year. We 
should let it sink into the landscape and in four of five years we should go 
and look out for possible changes. In particular we should look at how far 
discussions on the European and international level have advanced and 
for clues about the changes these might mean for the German corporate 
governance code.” (G) 
 
However, the main question is the extent to which regulatees accept the code 
and engage with it and understand its inherent flexibility. 
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 “I see some of the rules being very close to law. I don't believe and don't 
see the danger or need that some of them turn into law.” (G) 
 
Certainly the inherent flexibility of comply-or-explain, although somewhat 
novel in Germany, appears to help in this regard: 
 
“Yes, the moment you are allowed to say 'I don't comply and I explain why' 
you have reached maximum flexibility. Ok, the maximum would be when 
you don't have to do anything. But this is already quite a large amount of 
discretion, because law is law.” (G) 
 
The German interviewees did seem to speak of the code as a form of law, 
something less evident in the UK where regulation seems to be treated as 
qualitatively different to law. This emphasis on soft law as law does suggest that 
Borchardt and Wellens (1989) were correct in their observation that non-
binding rules can have the same effects as hard law. 
 
However, for others the Cromme code is interesting primarily because it is not 
statutory law. Notwithstanding the statute elements of the Cromme code there is 
a sense in which some did not seem to consider it as either law or regulation per 
se but rather as an extra-legal agreement between interested parties – the 
company and others with a legitimate interest in its governance: 
 
“[The code] is more flexible and more adaptable. I have the opinion that 
we don't have to always call the state and the lawmakers if we want to sort 
out some stuff between ourselves.” (G) 
 
Although flexible regulation may be less common in Germany than in the UK a 
sense of the importance of voluntarism was expressed by several interviewees: 
 
“Generally the German businesses want to plan and do everything on a 
voluntary basis, with as few laws as possible. We succeeded somehow on 
that way and now we should accept that as well. We can do everything by 
law, but I would question whether this would be better.” (G) 
 
and:  
 
“I think of the code has been good for several reasons. One crucial aspect 
is that because of it we could get away from statutory law. I think that the 
required [compliance] statement and modification to corporate law is 
right.” (G) 
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For some, hard law, because of its requisite universality, was unlikely to be able 
to set more than minimum standards: 
 
“One should not have here statutory law because at the end of the day [the 
code] could only determine the very basic rules of the game, but the not 
best practices which exceed the legal minimum. … [Hard law] is just the 
minimum of what one has to do but that does not turn you into a good 
manager.” (G) 
 
But levels of engagement with the code and with its legal form did of course 
vary: 
 
“Q: So what do you think about this being dealt with by a code, and not by 
a law? 
A: Your questions - I could not care less! You can regulate either way.” 
(G) 
 
Indeed, a large number of interviewees were far less positive about the Code. In 
this context, some raised the question of enforcement. For them it was less a 
matter of whether corporate governance was regulated by soft law or hard law 
but more to do with whether regulatees would follow the rules:  
 
“You can of course make a thousand laws. Of course there is the question 
of how much people stick to them and what penalties are imposed. I 
believe that in the governance of a company the integrity of the 
management is crucial, as is the integrity of the supervisory board that 
controls the management. There have been some or many cases of fraud in 
the past which is the reason, or at least part of the reason, for the 
corporate governance code - it is there to eliminate those. However I am 
not sure whether this is a successful endeavour. One can give people the 
feeling of security but at the end of the day it boils down to the trust you 
have in the management. It is a code. You can draft a law but I can break a 
law. The cases of fraud we had were carried out with a certain amount of 
care. They were not accidental. Whether I break a law or a code, at the 
end there will always be a corpus delicti.” (G) 
 
Other claimed that the regulation of German corporate governance was already 
dealt with more than adequately in corporate law: 
 
“In Germany questions of corporate governance are regulated much more 
precisely in corporate and business law compared to the Anglo-Saxon 
world. Such a strictly codified corporate governance law is unusual 
internationally.” (G)  
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Moreover the transaction costs associated with compliance with soft law, raised 
by some UK interviewees in respect of explaining rather than complying, were 
also an issue for some German interviewees:  
 
“I think that soft law is the wrong way to ensure best practice. At some 
point these best practices will cause so much increase in administration, 
documentation and other costs for companies that people will turn around 
and say, this is insane!” (G) 
 
And, as in the UK, the pressure to conform to norms could be quite strong: 
 
“It is astonishing how much force to regularise such a code has. The 
bottom line is that there is not much space for individuality.” (G) 
 
and: 
 
Peer pressure goes to the point that people do less and less where they 
deviate and where they have to explain. [...] In principle, everybody wants 
to be the swot. The more companies claim not to deviate the more people 
question whether it is worth the trouble to say 'I deviate' ” (G) 
 
… as does pressure from the public, articulated by the media: 
 
“De facto you cannot treat this anymore as flexible. The discussion about 
the board members' remuneration showed that. The public sinks its teeth 
into a subject matter which is not so important after all, hypes it up and 
pillories those who think that this is rubbish. And voluntariness says good 
bye.” (G) 
 
The Cromme code commissioners were also identified as exerting pressure 
towards full compliance by virtue of the way that compliance rates are 
highlighted: 
 
“There is comply or explain – something always slightly abused in 
Germany. When somebody explains and the stakeholders are happy with it, 
why is this wrong? [...] But the commission runs around and claims that 
97% fulfil all points. And I ask myself what is the point? Cromme is even 
proud of this. There might be lots of good reasons for many companies to 
not comply to specific points. And the stockholders seem to want that … 
otherwise they would complain which they don't do. […] Comply-or-
explain in Germany is immediately changed into 'comply and don't bother 
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us with explanations'. In my opinion this is wrong. This is no longer a 
voluntary regulation.” (G) 
 
However, the pivotal issue in determining attitudes to comply-or-explain in 
Germany has been the disclosure of director’s remuneration:  
 
“The fact that one third – absolutely within their rights – decided to 
explain [not publishing the individual salaries of board members] caused 
people to say that they were not sticking to the code. Nonsense. Of course 
they followed the Code.” 
 
In their survey of UK and German corporate governance statements Seidl, 
Sanderson & Roberts (2009) examined which rules generated most deviations. 
In the UK, issues of board independence dominated, mainly because of leavers 
or joiners or because a director’s status changed from independent to non-
independent by virtue of time served. The situation was in many cases 
temporary with the company assuring its investors in its corporate governance 
statement of a return to compliance on the issue once a replacement director had 
been appointed. However, refusing to disclose remuneration, the most common 
deviation in Germany, is not unavoidable – it speaks of self-interest – which 
may explain the reaction the explanations received from those monitoring 
compliance. In fact the pressure from the public on this issue led to the status of 
remuneration disclosure being modified, from a recommendation to 
incorporation in statute law: 
“[The minister] said that if people did not comply there would be a law ... 
She said you had better comply with the code. She said she would observe 
what was happening for one more year and if not, there would be a law. 
And that's what happened.” (G) 
 
This seemed to increase the sense of lack of ownership and also to increase the 
perception amongst quite a few interviewees that comply-or-explain was indeed 
for the most part merely a staging post on the way to full compliance: 
 
 “Of course it is a standard. And you don't want to write every year that 
you don't do this or that. At some point they get you and we all do the same 
rubbish. That's the case. You don't have to say much and the statement is 
much shorter. You know, this is the normative power of the standard. 
Insofar I would say that comply or explain in merciless. At some point you 
don't want to explain anymore and then you comply.” (G) 
 
The tendency towards full compliance was of course also observed in the UK 
interviews - but there is an important difference. Almost all interviewees in the 
UK perceived the contents of the Combined Code as embodying best practice 
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which in turn increased their sense of ownership of the Code. Full compliance is 
thus, in a sense, a perfectly natural part of the endgame for UK companies and 
the comply-or-explain mechanism enabled companies to conform with the code 
when circumstances such as mergers, takeovers, new listings and the sudden 
departure of directors made full compliance temporarily unattainable. For a 
number of German interviewees the mechanism was little more than a political 
sop to make the imposition of the code more palatable. At the extremes such 
attitudes were manifest in full non-conformance. This is not to suggest that such 
companies deviated from 100% of the rules in the Cromme Code – but rather 
that they made no effort to assess and publish details of the extent of their 
discretionary compliance: 
 
“We decided to generally reject it. … the idea of a code itself is rejected - 
not what is written in it. As I said, we had done a lot of what is in it before 
the code. This is … automatism. .... The fact is that if the lawmakers want 
something done they should make a law – they do anyway - there is enough 
law around. And if they do not want this, they should stay clear of it. But 
these recommendations – 'should', 'could' – what do I get out of it. 
Nothing. ... I think it is politic to say that I don't want to follow a code 
because I follow the law. And if this is not enough for lawmakers then they 
have to think about changing the law.” (G) 
 
Others also rejected the whole concept of soft law: 
 
“'Could' and 'should' rules - even for a lawyer this is a rather acrobatic art 
form. And for somebody who does not work with such texts and norms it 
becomes a nightmare. That's why this distinction is in my opinion very bad 
and has done nothing to further either codes or corporate governance. It 
would be great to shorten the code and get rid of all the recommendations. 
Get rid of them. Generally I am an opponent of the code. Either there is 
law or there is no law. I don't think soft law is very helpful.” (G) 
 
The same interviewee also expressed his anger at what he perceived to be the 
dishonesty of the whole process: 
 
“This has nothing to do with codes. You cannot say one has to comply with 
the code – otherwise it is law. Go and pass your law - yes or no. You can 
spare us this show of pretence that companies have discretion. Just be a bit 
more honest. Either politicians have the guts or they do not. To be honest, I 
think these intermediate forms [of law] are not fit for purpose.” (G) 
 
The notion that only hard law ensured compliance with the more contentious 
rules was not uncommon: 
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“We provided a template for the executive board. We stated what we need 
to change and the executive board actioned it. Also the supervisory board 
was told we are now fully compliant. The only difficulty was the 
remuneration of the executive board. Because it was just a 
recommendation at the beginning – a soft regulation – we did not publish. 
Once it became law, we published however, but with some discomfort on 
the part of the executive board which did not think this was right.” (G) 
 
and: 
 
“Q: How would this have developed if it had not been put into statute 
law?” 
A: Some would have remained uncompliant. I am sure about that.” (G) 
 
and: 
 
“One would like to do everything that the law prescribes - but nothing 
beyond that.” (G) 
 
In contrast with their UK counterparts a substantial section of the German 
interviewees were thus sceptical about compliance with soft law – both their 
own need to comply and the likelihood of others complying. This would suggest 
that monitoring is either absent, because their shares are held by a small number 
of insiders, or because the monitors themselves do not value the code 
sufficiently to use it to hold the management to account for their actions. 
Certainly those who declared full non-compliance would be likely to fall into 
the first category but further research would be required to address the second. 
The refusal to engage with the principle of comply-or-explain, another contrast 
with the evidence from the UK, would seem to be related to the perception that 
the code has been imposed from outside, although a lack of understanding of 
systems of self-regulation may also be playing a part.    
 
 
7.Summary 
 
 While UK based companies see the code as embodying best practice and 
so share a sense of ownership of the code with their larger counterparts 
this is not true to the same extent in Germany where the Cromme code is 
perceived by quite a few as a political instrument, imposed from outside. 
This impacts negatively upon its perceived legitimacy. Engagement of 
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regulatees leading to a sense of ownership would seem to be essential for 
the successful application of soft law.  
 
 However, as some UK interviewees commented positively about the 
careful consideration given to the development of the Combined code, 
and the fact that it has become embedded over time, German attitudes 
may well change as the Cromme code itself beds in and becomes just a 
normal part of the corporate landscape. Against this, the key enduring 
difference between the UK and Germany is the institutionalised nature of 
the process of developing and refining the latter’s code which may mean 
that German practitioners never assume a sense of code ownership to the 
same extent as their UK counterparts. 
 
 Although the reporting processes are almost identical further differences 
were noted in the intensity of monitoring. The dominance of institutional 
investors in the UK ensures interested and powerful monitors whereas 
there are more family owned companies in Germany and a capital market 
in which bank finance plays a far greater role. While there was strong 
criticism of those German companies that refused to publish directors’ 
remuneration this came primarily from outside the business community, 
strengthening the convictions of those who argued that codes are an alien 
form of regulation.  
 
 The outcome of the issue of the publication of directors’ remuneration - 
its transference to the statute section of the Cromme code - combined 
with the sense that the code is an alien imposition contributed to the 
greater level of scepticism in Germany about the benefits of comply-or-
explain.  Moreover while the UK interviewees generally understood that 
non-binding rules can have the same effects as hard law, a significant 
number of German interviewees found the concept of sot law nonsensical 
and either treated the soft elements of the code as hard law or refused to 
assess their own conformance at all. 
 
 Both sets of interviewees felt considerable pressure towards full 
conformance rather than engagement with comply-or-explain. This was 
depicted often as a response to the costs of non-conformance, in terms of 
both resources and reputation but also relates to the length of time the two 
codes have been in force and the extent to which they are considered to 
articulate best practice. The Combined code has become well embedded 
over 15 years and has been amended as necessary to reflect accepted best 
practice. The Cromme code is relatively new so practitioners have less 
experience of using comply-or-explain, and scepticism over soft law in 
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general has been reinforced by the outcome of the remuneration 
disclosure issue. 
 
 The paradox of the sustained nature of the trend towards full 
conformance in the UK is that, while it ought to be the natural default 
position if the code really does embody best practice, it may also lead to 
comply-or-explain falling into disuse, with the concomitant danger that, if 
and when companies need to avail themselves of the flexibility, monitors 
will be unused to its deployment and respond unsympathetically. 
Interestingly, the pressure interviewees felt to conform fully may be more 
perceived than real. Perhaps in contrast to their German counterparts, the 
UK interviewees seemed to perceive the environment they inhabit as 
harsher, less forgiving and altogether more punitive than the contextual 
interviews carried out with institutional shareholders would suggest. This 
corporate over-focus on potential punishment for deviant behaviour 
accords with the analysis by Roberts et al. (2006) who drew similar 
conclusions regarding the disciplinary effects of director-shareholder 
meetings. 
 
 Although there was more enthusiasm for comply-or-explain from UK 
interviewees than their German counterparts the sense of control over the 
governance of their companies it seemed to provide may be illusory. The 
great majority of the contents of the code become akin to hard law, or in 
the German case may well be hard law. Deviation is simply not 
acceptable. These rules form the bedrock of the code. A second smaller 
stratum of rules may have been or become sub-optimal, and following 
substantial deviation, may be amended and amalgamated into the first, 
lower stratum.  The final thin top layer consists of a very small number of 
rules such as board independence where temporary deviation may be 
unavoidable from time to time and it is these, and these only, where a 
valid explanation is deemed acceptable. 
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